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I. LINGUISTICS AS A FIELD OF KNOWLEDGE ABOUT LANGUAGE
In recent years, a growing number of linguists have begun to focus
their scholarly attention on the intersection of language and law. Evidence
of this burgeoning field abounds. There exists a scholarly organization
specifically dedicated to linguistic research pertaining to the law and legal
processes1 and a journal that exclusively publishes scholarship in the field.2
Linguistics-based papers and presentations are a regular feature of the Law
and Society Association Annual Meeting, the primary showcase for
* Dean's Distinguished Scholar and Professor of Law, Seattle University
School of Law; B.A., Brandeis University, 1975; M.A., Yale University, 1977; J.D.,
Harvard Law School, 1980.
1. The International Association of Forensic Linguists (IAFL) welcomes
participation by linguists and other scholars whose research addresses language and
law. For additional information about IAFL, see IAFL, http://www.iafl.org (last visited
Apr. 3, 2006).
2. This peer-reviewed journal, originally entitled Forensic Linguistics, is now
called The International Journal of Speech, Language, and the Law: Forensic
Linguistics. It began publication in 1994.
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interdisciplinary scholarship on legal practices, policies, and institutions.'
In addition, articles exploring various issues at the intersection of language
and law frequently appear both in law reviews and in scholarly linguistic
journals.4 Yet, for all of this growth in scholarly activity by both linguists
and other socio-legal scholars, many linguists have expressed a sense of
frustration that the legal system-lawyers, 5 judges, and the legal
academy 6-still have little idea what linguistics is about and fail to fully
appreciate the ways in which its insights could be useful or illuminating to
law.
The field of linguistics is a multi-faceted discipline incorporating the
systematic study of every aspect of human communication. One way of
appreciating the breadth of the field is to consider its examination of the
smallest, most basic units of human communication and move outward to
consider how the discipline analyzes each level involved in language.
3. There is such interest in language and law scholarship within that
organization that a Collaborative Research Network (CRN) has been established to
coordinate scholarship in the area of language and law. See Law and Society
Association, http://www.lawandsociety.org (last visited Apr. 3, 2006).
4. Judith Levi compiled a bibliography of scholarship addressing the
intersection of linguistics and law that was published by the American Bar Association.
JUDITH N. LEVI, LANGUAGE AND LAW: A BIBLIOGRAPHIC GUIDE TO SOCIAL SCIENCE
RESEARCH IN THE U.S.A. (1994). Law professor and linguist Peter Tiersma currently
maintains a web-based bibliography of selected articles and books on language and law
at LanguageandLaw.org, http://www.languageandlaw.org/BIBLIO.HTM (last visited
Apr. 3, 2006).
5. At conferences where language and law scholarship is presented, linguists
who consult in legal cases often trade war stories about their experiences. Lawyers and
judges, who have little idea of what linguistics is or how it could be appropriately
utilized, often think that what linguists do is police language for solecisms or
grammatical errors. Such attorney frequently are insulting, demeaning, and hectoring
on cross-examination. That last complaint, of course, is not limited to linguists but
shared by many expert witnesses. See, e.g., STANLEY L. BRODSKY, TESTIFYING IN
COURT: GUIDELINES AND MAXIMS FOR THE EXPERT WITNESS xi (1991) (noting that
some witnesses describe their testimony experiences as "terrifying" and "relate[]
stories of humiliation, distress, and feelings of absolute ineptness").
6. One notable attempt to bridge the gap between linguistics scholars and
legal scholars occurred in 1995. The Law and Linguistics Conference entitled, What is
Meaning in a Legal Text? A Dialogue Among Scholars of Law and Linguistics, was
jointly sponsored by Northwestern Law School and the Washington University School
of Law. During that two day conference, much of the discussion between the
linguistics professors and the law professors revolved around questions of what the
goals and methodologies of linguistics are and how this research might be utilized by
lawyers and legal scholars. A transcript of the sessions was later published along with
commentaries. See Conference, Northwestern University/Washington University Law
and Linguistics Conference, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 771 (1995).
[Vol. 54
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Within the field of linguistics, researchers are studying phonetics-the
analysis of human speech sounds;7 phonology-the structures and patterns
of sounds used within and among languages; 8 syntax-the rules for
ordering elements of meaning within a language;9 semantics-the
relationship between words and meaning;10 pragmatics-the study of
language and meaning in the context of larger discursive structures;1 and
discourse analysis-the interpretive and structural analysis of interpersonal
communication. 2 Linguistics as a discipline has a long undefended border
with any number of related disciplines and fields as well, generating such
sub-specialties as sociolinguistics - the study of language in its social
context; 13 psycholinguistics-the study of linguistic behavior in the context
of cognitive psychology; 4 anthropological linguistics-the cross-cultural
study of language use;15 and neurolinguistics-the study of the neurological
7. See generally J.C. CATFORD, A PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION TO PHONETICS
1 (2d ed. 2001); JOHN CLARK & COLIN YALLOP, AN INTRODUCTION TO PHONETICS
AND PHONOLOGY (2d ed. 1995).
8. See generally STEPHEN R. ANDERSON, PHONOLOGY IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 9 (1985); FRANCIS KATAMBA, AN INTRODUCTION TO PHONOLOGY 1 (1989);
ANDREW SPENCER, PHONOLOGY: THEORY AND DESCRIPTION (1996).
9. See generally ROBERT D. BORSLEY, SYNTACTIC THEORY: A UNIFIED
APPROACH (1991); ANDREW CARNIE, SYNTAx: A GENERATIVE INTRODUCTION 3-4
(2002); IVAN A. SAG & THOMAS WASOW, SYNTACTIC THEORY: A FORMAL
INTRODUCTION 2-3 (1999).
10. See generally IRENE HEIM & ANGELIKA KRATZER, SEMANTICS IN
GENERATIVE GRAMMAR 1-2 (1998); RAY JACKENDOFF, SEMANTIC STRUCTURES 1-4
(1990); JOHN LYONS, LINGUISTIC SEMANTICS: AN INTRODUCTION (1995); JOHN I.
SAEED, SEMANTICS 3 (1997).
11. See generally GEORGIA M. GREEN, PRAGMATICS AND NATURAL
LANGUAGE UNDERSTANDING 1-3 (1989); JACOB L. LEVY, PRAGMATICS: AN
INTRODUCTION 1-5 (1993); STEPHEN C. LEVINSON, PRAGMATICS (1983); PRAGMATICS:
A READER 3-11 (Steven Davis ed., 1991).
12. See generally GILLIAN BROWN & GEORGE YULE, DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 1
(1983); FRAMING IN DISCOURSE (Deborah Tannen ed., 1993); JOHN J. GUMPERZ,
DISCOURSE STRATEGIES 1-8 (1982); RONALD WARDHAUGH, How CONVERSATION
WORKS 1-23 (1985).
13. See generally J.K. CHAMBERS, SOCIOLINGUISTIC THEORY: LINGUISTIC
VARIATION AND ITS SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE 1-2 (1995); RALPH FASOLD, THE
SOCIOLINGUISTICS OF LANGUAGE 1-3 (1990); BARBARA JOHNSTONE, QUALITATIVE
METHODS IN SOCIOLINGUISTICS (2000); RONALD WARDHAUGH, AN INTRODUCTION
TO SOCIOLINGUISTICS 1 (2d ed. 1992).
14. See generally JEAN AITCHISON, THE ARTICULATE MAMMAL: AN
INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLINGUISTICS 1-5 (4th ed. 1998); MICHAEL GARMAN,
PSYCHOLINGUISTICS 3 (1990); PSYCHOLINGUISTICS (Jean Berko Gleason & Nan
Bernstein Ratner eds., 2d ed. 1998).
15. See generally NANCY BONVILLAIN, LANGUAGE, CULTURE, AND
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basis of language acquisition and use. 16 When Clifford Geertz wrote of the
modern confluence of intellectual disciplines, 17 linguistics could easily have
been the poster child for that process. Law, like other fields of knowledge
in which language plays a central role, has benefited from this research.
However, a fuller understanding of the nature of linguistics research could
open up new and more fruitful applications of this body of scholarship for
lawyers, judges, and legal scholars.
II. ADMISSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY AND THE EVOLVING
GATEKEEPING FUNCTION OF JUDGES
Linguistics research, like other expert evidence, can be properly
assimilated into law only to the extent that we understand its goals, its
distinctive methodologies, and its criteria for assessing the reliability of its
scholarly work. It is this concern for the appropriate use of knowledge
from outside the world of law that shapes the legal rules governing the
admissibility at trial of expert testimony. For many years the standard for
determining the admissibility of expert testimony was that articulated in
the 1923 case Frye v. United States.18 In Frye, the appropriate test or
standard governing admissibility of scientific evidence was defined as
turning on whether the science in question was "sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs." 19 This test was adopted not only in the federal courts but in most
state courts as well and became the predominant test for the admission of
scientific knowledge at trial. However, with the 1975 adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, it was unclear whether the Frye standard was
still the governing test in federal courts. Rule 702 liberalized the rules on
expert witness evidence by providing that testimony regarding technical or
scientific evidence could be admitted if it would "assist the trier of fact [in]
COMMUNICATION: THE MEANING OF MESSAGES (1993); CULTURAL MODELS IN
LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT (Dorothy Holland & Naomi Quinn eds., 1987); CAROL M.
EASTMAN, ASPECTS OF LANGUAGE AND CULTURE 1 (2d ed. 1990); ZDENEK
SALZMANN, LANGUAGE, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION TO LINGUISTIC
ANTHROPOLOGY 2-3 (1993).
16. See generally DAVID CAPLAN, NEUROLINGUISTICS AND LINGUISTIC
APHASIOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 3 (1987); HANDBOOK OF NEUROLINGUISTICS
(Brigitte Stemmer & Harry A. Whitaker eds., 1998).
17. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Blurred Genres: The Refiguration of Social Thought,
in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 19-35
(1983).
18. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
19. Id. at 1014.
654 [Vol. 54
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understand[ing] the evidence or [in] determin[ing] a fact in issue."20 Rule
702 was silent as to whether scientific consensus was still the threshold
standard for admission of such evidence.
In a series of cases in the early 1990s, the United States Supreme
Court interpreted Rule 702 as superseding the Frye test.21 In the first of
these cases, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,22 the Court held
that admissibility of scientific evidence in federal court requires a
determination of its scientific validity as well as its relevance to the matter
at hand.23 No longer was it dispositive for the trial court to ask whether
there was scientific consensus as to the reliability of the science behind
expert testimony. Instead, the Court propounded a nonexclusive four-
factor test for the admissibility of scientific evidence, emphasizing the trial
judge's affirmative responsibility to determine that proffered evidence is
"ground[ed] in the methods and procedures of science." 24 In addition to the
Frye touchstone of general acceptance within the scientific community
three other factors were added: whether the theory had been subjected to
falsifiable tests, whether the science in question "was subject[] to peer
review and publication," and whether there was a known error rate for the
test or theory in question.25 The Court reaffirmed this multi-factor test and
expanded the reach of the Daubert analysis in Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael.26 In Kumho, the Court indicated that the Daubert test was the
appropriate standard for admissibility not merely for scientific evidence,
but for all forms of technical or experiential expert testimony.27
The Daubert test has also been adopted in some state jurisdictions.28
Even for those states in which the Frye test or a variant is still the legal
20. FED. R. EVID. 702.
21. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993); see also
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) (explaining that Daubert's
"gatekeeping" obligation, requiring an inquiry into both relevance and reliability,
applies not only to "scientific" testimony, but to all expert testimony); Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997) (establishing that appellate courts applying the "abuse
of discretion" standard to a trial judge's evidentiary rulings may not categorically
distinguish between rulings allowing expert testimony and rulings disallowing it).
22. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
23. Id. at 589-90.
24. Id. (emphasis added).
25. Id. at 593-94.
26. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
27. Id. at 141.
28. See, e.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 579
(Ky. 2000) (noting the applicability of the Daubert test to all expert testimony pursuant
to Kentucky Rule of Evidence 702).
2006]
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standard for admissibility, the more stringent gatekeeping functions of the
Daubert test-are consistent with increasing concern over the admission of
so-called "junk science"-has tended to foster a greater judicial oversight
of expert testimony.29 While the Frye test focused on the question of
whether the proffered testimony was consistent with established consensus
of those within the field, the Daubert-governed judge has additional
gatekeeping responsibility and the authority to make an independent
determination of the validity of the underlying science, considering the
degree to which the field in question is based on testable or falsifiable
propositions, its error rate, and the degree to which the research has been
subjected to peer review.30 In short, Daubert is squarely based on a
positivist view of scientific expertise.31 Thus, to the extent that a
knowledge domain mimics the practices and methods of the "hard"
paradigm sciences, Daubert will militate in favor of the admissibility of its
forms of expertise. In contrast, for those domains of knowledge for which
a positivist view of knowledge is ill-fitting-for example, many social
sciences-Daubert may be misapplied as a roadblock to the admission of
valuable evidence.
III. Is LINGUISTICS A SCIENCE?
One might wonder why anyone would care whether linguistics is a
science, a social science, or somewhere in between. It may seem a pointless
taxonomy for the sake of taxonomy alone. This Article suggests, however,
that law has a responsibility to properly assess the nature of knowledge
claims within the disciplines that assert a privileged claim to some form of
"truth." Disciplinary methodologies, goals, and the assessment of what
counts as valid knowledge differ considerably for different scholarly
enterprises. Scholars in humanities like art criticism, history, philosophy,
and comparative literature are surely all seeking some kind of truth, but it
is of a different order and nature than the truth sought by a molecular
chemist or a geneticist. For example, a bad interpretation of War and
Peace is wrong in a different kind of way than a poorly designed
experiment in embryonic cloning is wrong. Of course, this is not to say that
hard sciences are in any sense absolutely objective. Modern philosophy of
29. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 153 & n.6 (1997) (noting the
Daubert Court's concern with "junk science").
30. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
31. For the classic exposition of positivism in the philosophy of science, see
KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (1961), which distinguishes
scientific inquiry from other belief systems by the insistence of science on the
falsifiability of its hypotheses.
[Vol. 54
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science has long recognized the degree to which science is itself an
interpretive form of knowledge.32 Nevertheless, the scope of interpretation
and framing varies for different disciplines along a continuum, with
humanities at one pole and physical sciences at the other. Social sciences
sit somewhere in the middle of this continuum, with some closer to the
sciences and others closer to the humanities.
Because the tests for the admission of expert testimony are structured
to best fit those forms of expertise that are most "science-like,"
understanding the disciplinary nature of the form of expertise at issue
becomes necessary. As noted, the Daubert test for expert testimony in
particular, maps closely onto a positivist model of scientific knowledge.33
Given the strictures of the Daubert factors as filters for admissible expert
evidence at trial,34 the more like a science a particular knowledge domain is
seen to be, the more receptive courts ought to be to admitting evidence
grounded in that domain. In this sense, the answer to the question "Is
linguistics a science?" really does matter because the more science-like
linguistic evidence is, the more readily it should be admitted.
So, how should we go about determining whether linguistics is a
science? One way to do so would be to ask linguists what methodologies
and disciplinary characteristics mark the field of linguistics and whether
they think what they are doing is a science. At a joint conference of
linguists and legal scholars held in 1995,35 that very question was posed by
the lawyers to the linguists. Linguist Jerrold Sadock expressed some
skepticism about whether the category of science was itself more
problematic than the lawyers might think, but even with that caveat he
situated linguistics within the realm of science.36 He defined sciences as
disciplines- that make falsifiable predictions about data outside the
32. See generally H.M. COLLINS & T.J. PINCH, FRAMES OF MEANING: THE
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EXTRAORDINARY SCIENCE (1982); MARY HESSE,
REVOLUTIONS AND RECONSTRUCI'ONS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (1980);
THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970). Even
engineering, the most relentlessly quantitative of sciences, is not as cut-and-dried and
mathematically governed as we might imagine. See EUGENE S. FERGUSON,
ENGINEERING AND THE MIND'S EYE xii (1993) (arguing "that most of an engineer's
deep understanding is by nature nonverbal, the kind of intuitive knowledge that
experts accumulate").
33. See discussion supra Part II.
34. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
35. Conference, supra note 6, at 785.
36. Id. at 905.
20061
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discipline37 and "involve[s] a tight set of rules . . . that aren't merely
observations of the event you're attempting to describe."3 8 Based on this
positivist definition of science, Sadock argues that "linguistics gets a pretty
high score as a science[:] ... a 70 out of 100 .... And it's probably one of
the highest if not the highest score of any social science[,]" though not as
high as he thought physics would score.39 Judith Levi, another linguist in
attendance at the conference, agreed with Sadock that linguistics is a
scientific activity.40 She described modern linguistics 41 as a "theory building
enterprise where [linguists] develop[] rigorous expectations for [the
description of] language," analogous to the theory-testing activities of
physicists and chemists. 42  She noted that linguists' hypotheses about
language make predictions that can be tested by external data and that
these hypotheses will either be corroborated or not by that data.43
This categorization of linguistics as science is not unique to practicing
linguists. The venerable Oxford Dictionary defines linguistics as "the
scientific study of languages and its structure." 4  Linguists take their
professional place within the world of academic science. The Linguistics
Society of America is a member of the umbrella organization for the
sciences-the American Association for the Advancement of Science
(AAAS).45 Linguists take part in the cavalcade of scientific presentations
37. The concept of falsifiability is key to a positivist view of science in which
only those hypotheses whose predictions can be in some way tested count as "science."
Unless a theory can be tested in such a way as to disconfirm it, the theory is not
scientific. See POPPER, supra note 31, at 40-41.
38. Conference, supra note 6, at 905.
39. Id. at 905-06.
40. Id. at 899-900.
41. By modern linguistics, I am referring to post-Chomskyan linguistics.
While many linguists vigorously disagree with Noam Chomsky with respect to
particulars of the various theories he has propounded since the 1950s, no one seriously
denies that the agendas he set have transformed the field of contemporary linguistic
inquiry. His enormous influence is impossible to overstate-even those who reject his
positions tend to define their theories in relation to Chomsky's positions. See generally
RANDY ALLEN HARRIS, THE LINGUISTICS WARS (1993); FREDERICK J. NEWMEYER,
LINGUISTIC THEORY IN AMERICA (2d ed. 1986); NEIL SMITH & DEIDRE WILSON,
MODERN LINGUISTICS: THE RESULT OF CHOMSKY'S REVOLUTION (1979).
42. Conference, supra note 6, at 899.
43. Id.
44. THE OXFORD AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY 781 (2002). This usage
is consistent with that given in DAVID CRYSTAL, A DICTIONARY OF LINGUISTICS AND
PHONETICS 204 (3d ed. 1991), which defines linguistics as "[t]he scientific study of
language."
45. See American Association for the Advancement of Science,
[Vol. 54
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held annually under the auspices of the AAAS, presenting their latest
research alongside researchers in such fields as astrophysics, marine
biology, and nanotechnology. From the point of view of other scientists,
linguists are fellow scientific researchers.
As a science, then, linguistics demands that the test for the
acceptability of a linguistics theory is not whether it is elegant, interesting,
or plausible, but solely whether it correctly makes predictions that fit
linguistic data. Often well-articulated theories have to be abandoned when
they fail to make correct predictions about data. For example, Judith Levi
described a theory of compound nouns that she developed in 1978 as "a
great theory ... it was really neat. ' 46 But, she noted ruefully, she had to
discard it because it turned out to be wrong.47 Another example, one of the
most highly contentious debates within modern linguistics, was the
acrimonious challenge between generative semantics and interpretive
semantics in the 1970s. Despite the dedicated scholarly contributions to
generative semantics by a number of exceptionally bright and imaginative
scholars, it ultimately failed because, in the words of linguist Jerry Fodor,
"it was disconfirmed"; that is, language data stubbornly failed to fit the
predictions of the generative semantics framework. 48 Because the field of
linguistics operates under the methodologies and assessment standards of
positivist science, testing proffered linguistics evidence under the Daubert
standard should appropriately measure its validity.
IV. LINGUISTIC EVIDENCE AS AN AID TO FACT-FINDING
The testimony of linguists has in recent years been offered in both
civil and criminal cases as relevant to a myriad of specific issues. It is
difficult to come up with an accurate measurement of the number of cases
in which linguists have been used. However, based on the writings of
linguists describing their experiences as expert witnesses, it appears that
linguistic expertise is being increasingly utilized by litigants, both as
consultants in cases that ultimately settle and as expert witnesses at trial.49
http://www.aaas.org (last visited Mar. 30, 2006).
46. Conference, supra note 6, at 901.
47. Id.
48. HARRIS, supra note 41, at 241.
49. See generally Judith N. Levi, Language as Evidence: The Linguist as
Expert Witness in North American Courts, 1 FORENSIC LINGISTICS 1-3 (1994). Linguist
Roger Shuy has personally consulted on several hundred cases and testified in dozens.
For a discussion of some of those cases, see generally ROGER W. SHUY, CREATING
LANGUAGE CRIMES: How LAW ENFORCEMENT USES (AND MISUSES) LANGUAGE
(2005) [hereinafter SHUY, CREATING LANGUAGE CRIMES]; ROGER W. SHUY,
2006]
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An examination of appellate case law almost certainly understates the
extent to which linguists are appearing in court. Cases that the party
proffering the linguist's testimony win are obviously not appealed by that
party, even if the linguist was not permitted to testify, and, thus, such cases
are invisible in the appellate record. Likewise, cases in which there was no
objection at trial to the linguist's testimony will also be absent from the
record because failure to object generally precludes appellate review. An
appellate issue is most typically created when the losing party's proffer of
linguistic expert testimony has been rejected. The losers in these
circumstances face a daunting burden on appeal. Trial judges have long
had-and, under recent Supreme Court precedent, continue to have-
enormous discretion in the admission or exclusion of expert testimony,
reviewable only for manifest abuse of discretion. 0 Because the standard of
review is so deferential to trial court decisions on admissibility of expert
evidence, appellate cases upholding trial court exclusion of linguistic
evidence are not an accurate indicator of the degree of judicial hostility
toward this type of expertise. Trial court receptivity to linguistic evidence
is thus far more favorable than appellate case law would suggest.
Criminal cases present a multitude of issues for which a linguist's
expertise could prove valuable. For example, where a defendant is accused
of making a tape-recorded threat, analysis of the regional dialect
characteristics of the threatener's voice could potentially exclude the
defendant as the person making the threat.5 Discourse analysis of
surreptitiously recorded conversations can help jurors determine whether
someone made a threat, solicited a bribe, or was rather the victim of police
entrapment.52 Similarly, a linguist's analysis of taped conversations could
LANGUAGE CRIMES: THE USE AND ABUSE OF LANGUAGE EVIDENCE IN THE
COURTROOM (1993) [hereinafter SHUY, LANGUAGE EVIDENCE IN THE COURTROOM];
ROGER W. SHUY, THE LANGUAGE OF CONFESSION, INTERROGATION AND DECEPTION
(1998) [hereinafter SHUY, CONFESSION, INTERROGATION AND DECEPTION]; ROGER
SHUY, LINGUISTIC BATTLES IN TRADEMARK DISPUTES (2002) [hereinafter SHUY,
TRADEMARK DISPUTES]. See also Peter Tiersma & Lawrence M. Solan, The Linguist
on the Witness Stand: Forensic Linguists in American Courts, 78 LANGUAGE 221, 221-
23 (2001) (discussing the increasing use of linguists as expert witnesses in court).
50. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 138-39 (1997).
51. Levi, supra note 49, at 2-3 (discussing three cases exonerating defendants
in threat cases); see also Bethany K. Dumas, Voice Identification in a Criminal Law
Context, 65 AM. SPEECH 341, 341 (1990).
52. See generally SHUY, CREATING LANGUAGE CRIMES, supra note 50
(collecting and discussing cases involving discourse analysis); SHUY, LANGUAGE
EVIDENCE IN THE COURTROOM, supra note 49 (same); SHUY, CONFESSION,
INTERROGATION AND DECEPTION, supra note 49 (same); LAWRENCE M. SOLAN &
PETER M. TIERSMA, SPEAKING OF CRIME: THE LANGUAGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 179-
[Vol. 54
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be helpful in determining whether purported misstatements in a warrant
application based on those conversations rise to the level necessary to
require a Franks hearing. 53  Linguists with expertise in language
comprehension could be useful to assess the English language proficiency
of a defendant in determining whether she was able to understand enough
English to validly waive her Miranda rights or consent to a search.54 More
generally, linguistic analysis of the comprehensibility of Miranda warnings
could be helpful in judging the level of understanding of juveniles, those of
low intelligence, or those with cognitive impairment.55  Likewise,
sociolinguistic and pragmatic analysis could be highly relevant to whether a
particular suspect had attempted to invoke her Miranda rights in the
context of police questioning.5 6
Civil cases also present many kinds of issues and problems for which
linguistic expertise could be valuable. For example, a linguist could
perform a semantic analysis to assess the adequacy of a warning label at
issue in a personal injury action.57 Comprehensibility of documents or
notices is frequently at issue in civil actions; linguistic testimony would
obviously be relevant in such cases.58 For example, in one case the
plaintiffs proffered a linguist to provide evidence that American Sign
Language users would not necessarily receive adequate notice from signs
posted in English.5 9 In another case, employees alleging that English-only
211 (2005) (discussing cases involving threats, solicitation, and bribery).
53. See United States v. Jabero, 368 F. Supp. 2d 702, 716 (E.D. Mich. 2005)
(finding that analysis of taped conversation by linguist did not convince trial court to
order a Franks hearing on whether there were material misstatements in search
warrant application).
54. See, e.g., Levi, supra note 49, at 18-20; Tiersma & Solan, supra note 50, at
227-28; see also United States v. Gutierrez-Mederos, 965 F.2d 800, 803 (9th Cir. 1992)
(addressing linguist's expert testimony as to defendant's English language proficiency
on the issue of whether he had consented to search).
55. SOLAN & TIERSMA, supra note 52, at 73-93.
56. Id. at 106-08. See generally Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register:
The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 298-315
(1993) (discussing the problems with suspects' ambiguous and equivocal invocations of
their right to counsel).
57. See generally Bethany K. Dumas, Warning Labels and Industry Safety
Information Standards: The Case of Loctite RC/609, in LANGUAGE IN ACrION: NEW
STUDIES OF LANGUAGE IN SOCIETY 302 (Joy Kreeft Peyton et al. eds., 2000).
58. See Levi, supra note 49, at 7-9, 13-14, 16-18; Tiersma & Solan, supra note
50, at 227.
59. Hall v. Saint Joseph's Hosp., 777 A.2d 1002, 1006 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2001) (permitting a linguist to testify that the deaf patient was basically
monolingual in American Sign Language and would have had difficulty adequately
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workplace rules were violative of their rights successfully used linguistic
expert testimony on the prevalence and importance of code-switching
among bilingual speakers. 60
One type of case in which linguists routinely testify is trademark
litigation,61 often with both sides offering linguistic testimony. 62
Morphological and phonological evidence can be proffered to demonstrate
the likelihood of consumer confusion or dilution of the value of the mark in
question. Recent cases involving this kind of expert evidence include
whether Barnes and Noble infringed Half Price Books' trademark in using
the phrase "half price books, '63 whether Burger King was entitled to call a
new menu item "steakburger" when that term had earlier been used by
another restaurant chain,64 whether a magazine could use the term
"entrepreneur" in its title when there already existed a magazine by that
name,65 and whether a candy company could call its gummy fish candy
"Famous Sqwish Candy Fish" without infringing the trademark "Swedish
Fish" for similar candy.66 Linguistic evidence has also been utilized in
trademark cases to resolve the question of whether a once-protected
trademark has become a generic term no longer entitled to legal protection
from infringement.67 One of the more unusual trademark cases in which
linguistic evidence was admitted was an appeal taken from the cancellation
of trademarks based on the team name "Redskins" on the grounds that
understanding written information).
60. EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1069-71(N.D. Tex. 2000) (relying on linguist's testimony concerning code-switching of bilingual
speakers in finding civil rights violation in English-only workplace rules).
61. Linguist Roger Shuy has been an expert consultant and witness in so
many trademark cases that he has written an entire book about some of the cases on
which he has worked. See SHUY, TRADEMARK DISPUTES, supra note 49.
62. See, e.g., Quality Inns Int'l, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198,
215-16 (D. Md. 1988) (admitting linguistic evidence from both parties on the question
of whether "McSleep" motels infringed McDonald's trademark); see Levi, supra note
49, at 5-6 (detailing the testimony in the McDonald's case).
63. Half Price Books, Records, Magazines, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, LLC,
No. Civ. A. 302CV2518-G, 2003 WL 23175436, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2003).
64. Steak n Shake Co. v. Burger King Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 983, 985 (E.D.
Mo. 2004).
65. Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2002).
66. Malaco Leaf, AB v. Promotion in Motion, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d. 355, 360-
62 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
67. See, e.g., Am. Thermos Prods. Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 9,
20 (D. Conn. 1962), affd sub nom. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc.,
321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963) (demonstrating with semantic analysis how the term
"thermos" had become generic and was no longer protected).
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trademarks that are derogatory and offensive are subject to cancellation. 68
When trial courts reject proffered expert testimony by linguists they
do so for a variety of reasons, some entirely legitimate and others more
problematic. In some cases, trial courts have determined that the proffered
testimony was based on unreliable methodologies and thus was potentially
confusing to the jury.69  Others have found inadequate evidence of
expertise on the part of the proffered witness70 or that the expert had
insufficient data upon which to render a reliable opinion in the case.71 In
addition, certain kinds of linguistic testimony are sufficiently controversial
among linguists that courts are unlikely to find such evidence adequately
reliable because it lacks scientific consensus. For example, the accuracy of
so-called "voiceprints" to identify speakers, 72 and of author identification
of written documents through stylistic analysis73 are still hotly debated
within the linguistic scholarly community. Rejecting testimony for any of
these reasons is entirely consistent with the gatekeeping obligation trial
judges have to ensure that admitted evidence is relevant and reliable.
Other reasons sometimes given for excluding expert testimony are
less convincing, however. Judges have at times excluded expert testimony
because it is feared that the credentials and expertise of the witness will
overawe the jurors and cause them to give undue weight to the testimony.74
68. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 107-09 (D.D.C. 2003),
reh'g denied, 415 F.3d 44 (D.D.C. 2005) (en banc).
69. E.g., Mowry v. Viacom Int'l, Inc., No. 03 Civ. 3090, 2005 WL 1793773, at
*12-14 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2005) (holding that the testimony of a linguist premised on
highly unusual methodology without demonstrated indicia of reliability was properly
excluded).
70. E.g., United States v. Tin Yat Chin, 371 F.3d 31, 40-41 (2d Cir. 2004)
(reviewing the district court's limitation of defendant's expert testimony on the
grounds that the proffer failed to show adequate expertise and data upon which to
make her determination).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Gutierrez-Mederos, 965 F.2d 800, 803 (9th Cir.
1992) (noting that the linguistics expert had never interviewed the defendant and that
most of her testimony consisted of "responses to hypothetical questions that presumed
[the defendant's] limited language skills and 'cultural heritage"').
72. SOLAN & TIERSMA, supra note 52, at 140-48 (noting skepticism within the
field as to the reliability of voiceprint evidence); see also Levi, supra note 50, at 1-2.
73. SOLAN & TIERSMA, supra note 52, at 149-78 (noting that although some
promising methodologies are being developed for author identification from a sample
corpus of writings, reliability of these techniques has not yet been demonstrated).
74. See generally United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(articulating concern that experts may assume "mystic infallibility" in eyes of jurors);
United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 1973) (expressing concern
regarding experts' "aura of special reliability and trustworthiness").
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Social scientists investigating this possibility have concluded, however, that
this fear is unwarranted. Jurors, it turns out, are quite capable of
evaluating scientific expert evidence fairly75 and without giving it excessive
weight in their deliberations. 76
Another reason some judges have given to exclude expert testimony
by linguists is the erroneous belief that the linguist has no expertise beyond
that possessed by jurors themselves." Professor, linguist, and lawyer
Lawrence Solan has called this the "we have a jury, so who needs a
linguist?" rationale for excluding linguistic expertise. 78 Roger Shuy, a
linguist who has frequently testified in court, describes the tension for the
linguist between being too technical in one's testimony-risking that the
judge will exclude the testimony as confusing and unhelpful to the jury-
and being too straightforward and non-technical-risking that the judge
will exclude the testimony because it does not add to what the jurors
already know.79 He notes that judges who may be skeptical about whether
a linguist's testimony assists the jury's understanding of language
misunderstand what it is that linguists do when they analyze data. ° For
example, Shuy often performs discourse analyses of tape recorded
conversations at issue in a trial:
75. Michael S. Jacobs, Testing the Assumptions Underlying the Debate About
Scientific Evidence: A Closer Look at Juror "Incompetence" and Scientific
"Objectivity," 25 CONN. L. REV. 1083, 1094-98 (1993) (discussing studies indicating that
jurors are able to draw valid factual conclusions even with regard to complicated
scientific matters).
76. Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence: Social
Framework Testimony, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 133, 173 (reviewing
studies assessing whether expert testimony carries excessive weight with jurors and
concluding that it does not).
77. See, e.g., Tilton v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 938 F. Supp. 751, 753 (N.D.
Okla. 1995), affd, 95 F.3d 32 (10th Cir. 1996).
78. Lawrence M. Solan, Can the Legal System Use Experts on Meaning?, 66
TENN. L. REV. 1167, 1180 (1999).
79. SHUY, LANGUAGE EVIDENCE IN THE COURTROOM, supra note 49, at xix.
He notes the following:
Appearing as an expert witness may well be the ultimate test of the applied
linguist, since we are expected to be technically expert enough to have useful
things to tell the jury but, at the same time, effective enough as teachers to be
able to communicate technical information in ways that can be of immediate
interest and usefulness to a jury.
Id.
80. Id. at xvii.
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Prosecutors regularly proclaim that it does not take [linguistics]
expertise to hear and understand a conversation. One such prosecutor
recently asked me, in fact, whether I had had my hearing checked
recently. His focus, of course, was on the wrong thing. A linguist's
hearing may be no better than a juror's hearing, but the linguist's
listening skills are finely honed by training and experience. Listening
goes beyond hearing. ... It includes attending to the many things that
average listeners overlook when they hear speech
• ..[L]inguists know what to listen for in a conversation. They
listen for topic initiations, topic recycling, response strategies,
interruption patterns, intonation markers, pause lengths, speech event
structure, speech acts, inferencing, ambiguity resolution, transcript
accuracy and many other things. Scientific training enables linguists to
categorize structures that are alike and to compare or contrast
structures that are not.8 1
Just as linguists may help to focus jurors on aspects of a conversation
that they would have failed to pay attention to without such guidance,
linguists may also be helpful in elucidating structures of meaning in legal
documents. Although courts have generally not been receptive to the
admission of this sort of testimony,82 it has been suggested that this
evidence could be helpful to courts, with the linguist serving not as an
arbiter of meaning but rather as a "semantic 'tour guide.' 83 In that role,
the linguist would assist the court by providing the scientific framework in
which to understand intuitions speakers have about language and meaning.
Solan gives the example of a linguist who was asked to perform a syntactic
analysis of some purportedly ambiguous language in a contract. 84
Although the ultimate issue of whether the language really was subject to
differing interpretations was properly for the trier of fact, the linguist's
analysis did demonstrate that the structure of the language in question was
consistent with two different interpretations. 85 In that case, the linguist's
81. Id. at xvii-xviii.
82. See, e.g., Durkin v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 406 F.3d 410, 420-21 (7th
Cir. 2005) (finding no abuse of discretion to exclude linguist's testimony as to whether
collection letters were confusing or ambiguous); Howard v. Or. Mut. Ins. Co., 46 P.3d
510, 515 (Idaho 2002) (finding no abuse of discretion in striking proffered testimony by
linguist as to whether an insurance contract provision was ambiguous); see also Solan,
supra note 79, at 1180-82 (noting cases that have rejected testimony by linguists,
including testimony on the meaning of insurance contracts).
83. Solan, supra note 78, at 1184.
84. Id. at 1189-90.
85. Id. at 1190.
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''semantic tour" may well have been helpful to the jury in reaching their
verdict.86
V. LINGUISTIC EXPERTISE IN AID OF PUBLIC POLICY
This Article has been focusing thus far on the use of linguistic
expertise by trial courts to aid in fact-finding in individual cases. There is,
however, another way that the law can make use of linguistic expertise, and
it is one that is largely underutilized at present-namely, the use of
linguistic knowledge by appellate courts as a tool for crafting and applying
doctrinal rules. The distinction between these two uses of social science
research was first pointed out by Professor Kenneth Davis in his dichotomy
between what he called "adjudicative facts" -those facts that are specific to
a particular set of litigants in a particular cause of action-and "legislative
facts"-those relevant to the development and articulation of the
appropriate contours and applications of legal doctrine transcending a
specific cases.87 John Monahan and Lauren Walker have appropriated
Davis's categories and renamed them "social facts" and "social
authority;" -terminology that perhaps better captures the case-specific
fact-finding and case-transcendent rule-developing notions behind the
distinction.8 8  Although some appellate courts have explicitly89 and
implicitly90 made use of linguistics research as "social authority," generally
86. Id.
87. Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the
Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364,423-25 (1942).
88. John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining,
Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 482-91
(1986). Monahan and Walker have gone on to elaborate their suggestion that social
science research be more comprehensively utilized as a resource in propounding and
applying legal rules. See generally John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Empirical
Questions Without Empirical Answers, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 569 (1991); Laurens Walker
& John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L.
REV. 559 (1987).
89. For example, the United States Supreme Court in its 1994 term cited with
approval a book review co-authored by law professors and linguists using linguistic
research to support its ultimate resolution of several cases. See United States v.
Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 53 (1994) (citing Clark D. Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning
and Hard Cases, 103 YALE L.J. 1561 (1994) (reviewing LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE
LANGUAGE OF JUDGES (1993))); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 623 (1994)
(same); Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S.
267, 272 (1994) (same).
90. In Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), the petitioners cited the
Cunningham book review in their reply brief to the Court. See Reply Brief for
Petitioners at 2 n.1, 3 n.2, Bailey, 516 U.S. 137 (Nos. 94-7448, 94-7492). While the
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appellate courts have made less use of this resource than have trial courts.91
This Article advocates that appellate courts take full advantage of
scientific linguistics research as a resource to aid them in the articulation
and the application of legal rules that depend in some way on an
understanding of how language works.92 In Language Crimes, linguist
Roger Shuy describes misconceptions jurors have about the nature of
language and its social use.93 He then demonstrates how his testimony was
used in a number of cases to overcome those mistaken beliefs and promote
more accurate factual determinations.94 But it is not just good fact-finding
that can be hampered by misconceptions about language. Legal doctrines
themselves are premised on unexamined beliefs about how language
works-beliefs that are often misconceived and inaccurate. Just as
scientific linguistic knowledge is crucial in resolving particular factual
disputes accurately, so too it is also indispensable in crafting legal rules that
are consonant with how people actually use language. In The Language of
Judges, linguist Lawrence Solan argues judges do not make good linguists.95
This is not meant as an indictment of judges-any more than if he were to
say that judges make poor astronomers. What Solan means is that a lack of
scientific linguistic training can cause judges to employ incoherent and
inconsistent underlying theories of language and meaning. To the extent
that judges utilize something that on the surface looks like linguistic
principles, they are frequently forced to subordinate these quasi-linguistic
principles to other values and principles to get the case "right." Judges
would be better off having the benefit of actual linguistic expertise. This
would be beneficial not because the linguistic principles would be
dispositive in crafting legal doctrines, but because scientifically valid
linguistic concepts could then be explicitly considered and weighed against
competing values, concepts, and principles in an open and honest manner.
Court did not cite the book review in its opinion, its reasoning seems to parallel the
review's analysis.
91. For example, despite the fact that the Law and Linguistics Consortium,
composed of linguists and law professors, filed an amicus brief in United States v. X-
Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S 64 (1994), the Court's ultimate decision did not appear to
be influenced by their analysis.
92. Other scholars have suggested appellate courts make greater use of other
kinds of scientific and technical expertise that are provided through amicus curiae
briefs. See, e.g., Stephanie Tai, Friendly Science: Medical, Scientific, and Technical
Amici Before the Supreme Court, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 789, 794-97 (2000).
93. SHUY, LANGUAGE EVIDENCE IN THE COURTROOM, supra note 49, at 1-19.
94. Id.
95. LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 59-63 (1993).
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Judges, in both trial and appellate courts, have become increasingly
comfortable taking economic analysis into account in determining
appropriate legal rules. Law and Economics scholarship, both in its
original University of Chicago-based incarnation and in its numerous
progeny and spin-offs, has been frequently cited with approval by appellate
courts in arriving at and articulating the most appropriate rules in resolving
legal issues.96 No one seriously suggests that doctrine driven by economic
perspectives is in any sense illegitimate. Neither should legal doctrine that
takes into account the science of linguistics be problematic. Ironically,
measured by the Daubert standards, linguistics would appear to be at least
as scientifically valid as the "dismal science" of economics. Although
neither discipline has much use for laboratories and white coats,97 the
theoretical predictions of linguistics are more easily testable and falsifiable
through examination of objective data than those of economics. Utilizing
research in linguistics where pertinent is no more inappropriate and no
more threatening to the legal order than using economic insights has been.
Appellate courts are by no means the only forums in which linguistic
expertise could be valuable to the legal system. To take just one example,
linguist and law professor Peter Tiersma recently played a major role in
rewriting the California pattern jury instructions used in criminal cases to
make them less confusing and less ambiguous.98 Linguistic research in the
comprehensibility of texts has obvious utility in the crafting of jury
instructions that are properly understood by lay readers.99 Likewise,
linguists who have studied textual ambiguity can flush out unintended
instances of lexical, syntactic, and indexical ambiguity in proposed
instructions and rewrite them to eliminate the problem. Often ambiguity in
a text goes unnoticed by its original author because the author knows what
96. See, e.g., Harvard Real Estate-Allston, Inc. v. KMART Corp., 407 F.
Supp. 2d 317, 320 n.2 (D. Mass. 2005) ("With the rise of law and economics scholarship,
it is difficult to conceive of any legal dispute that cannot be expressed through a
plausible, if speculative, valuation framework.").
97. Jerry Sadock described how experiments to test the validity of linguistics
theories proceed: It begins with a hypothesis that:
Make[s] different predictions [and] ... different claims about facts. Then we'll
go out and test those facts. We'll perform an experiment. The thing about
experiments in linguistics is they're not very grand. They usually consist of just
thinking, no laboratories, no white coat. You don't even have to wash your
hands usually.
Conference, supra note 6, at 910.
98. SOLAN & TIERSMA, supra note 52, at 248 n.46.
99. Tiersma & Solan, supra note 49, at 227.
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he intended to say and thinks he has clearly said it. Because linguists
understand the structural aspects of language that give rise to ambiguity, 1°°
they can more easily spot unintended ambiguities than untrained writers
can. Legislatures and law reform commissions need the expertise of
linguists as much as judges and courts do if law is to reflect the reality of
the human social order.
So much of what we are and do as humans is composed of or
mediated by language that it would seem obvious that the science of
language would be highly relevant for sound policy analysis in law. Indeed,
the centrality of an understanding of the nature of language and its use to
any understanding of the human social world has led one linguist to wryly
comment that linguistics has become the quintessential "universal donor"
discipline to the scholarly world. 101 As suggested in this Article, the legal
system has already been enriched by donations from linguistics scholarship,
but there are many additional areas in which lawyers and judges could and
should make fruitful use of the research generated by the universal donor
discipline of linguistics.
100. There are defined structural explanations for the ambiguities in simple
sentences like: "Everyone didn't like the movie.", "The missionaries are too hot to
eat.", "Visiting relatives can be tedious.", "Competent women and men have all the
good jobs.", and "What disturbed John was being ignored by everyone." Linguists'
understanding of the structural genesis of ambiguity can uncover such problems in
more complex sentences as well. For a comprehensive (if dauntingly technical)
linguistic analysis of textual forms of ambiguity, see GRAEME HIRST, SEMANTIC
INTERPRETATION AND THE RESOLUTION OF AMBIGUITY (1987).
101. Robin Tolmach Lakoff, Redrawing the Gender Line in the Sand, Lecture
Handout given at Seattle University, Jan. 13, 2005 (on file with author).
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